I was having a conversation this morning with a friend in Dhaka, who was making a case that Indians are unhappy with Sheikh Hasina because of her so-called rapprochement with China and that the Indians are now looking for ways to engage anti-AL forces to balance the game. He was optimistic that this time Indians will really help “establish democracy” in Bangladesh. I challenged that line of reasoning on the following grounds. I would like to share my points for politicians who are interested in pursuing a democratic Bangladesh while being mindful of its sovereignty:
1. Indians have a history of playing double game to keep its own game alive and always have their Plan B and contingency plan ready. If Sheikh Hasina has a friend now, it’s India, if she needs to fear an enemy – it’s India too. For India, Sheikh Hasina is an ally as long as they need, and she is expendable. For Sheikh Hasina, that’s your inbuilt risk of not deriving your legitimacy from your own people.
2. Watch out our “men on horseback” because that’s likely to be the first pawn in the game. The agencies of people’s power have successfully been dismantled one-by-one over the last decade; hence, the only organized force remained to challenge the status quo are the men on horseback—could be triggered by either from the person on top or his substitutes, a contingency. You can bet both plans have been put in place. With how much effect, only time can tell.
3. That said, Sheikh Hasina is still India’s best bet no matter what the political rhetoric suggests. She delivered on her promises; therefore, unless a significant concession made to China or the Chinese encroachment is imminent, Indians will not harm her. After all, a known enemy is better than an unknown friend. Sheikh Hasina has proven to dadas her trust and loyalty and there is little reason for Indians to ditch her at the moment.
4. Sheikh Hasina is pretty much a Machiavellian character and plays or ready to play all dirty tricks to manipulate the game. Please do not be surprised if she sets up thing to expose you to your ‘likely’ allies. There is a deep connotation of this last assertion – if you are smart, read between the lines.
5. Undeniably, Sheikh Hasina is in a deep shithole now, not because of the opposition parties’ success to corner her, but because of the coronavirus situation and how the contradictions in her politics created a mess around it – she, for her own benefits, created, nurtured corrupt functionaries and played dubious double games with friends and foes alike. If she now suffers from a sheer governance deficit, this is her own making. Let us rather allow her to face the music. If her foreign allies are skeptical of her, it’s her over-smartness.
6. Those who believe Indians will be an ally to Bangladesh’s democratic aspiration, are terribly unfit to rule Bangladesh. In the statecraft, there is no gut feeling for any moral position that supersedes the interest of the state. Let’s evaluate the costs and benefits of a democratic Bangladesh from an Indian perspective. If one examines the foreign policy behavior of India over the last few decades, there is no incentive for Indians to see Bangladesh ruled by a democratic regime, which will be inherently incapable of giving Indians the concessions they want. For obvious reasons, Indians will pursue their own national interests. However, the Indian foreign policy in the region has been proved rather unwise and driven by ‘maximalist’ tendency. They want more than they are ready to give.
7. Very few democratic regimes in the world can survive if they submit to the whim of a foreign government or make deals that go against the interest of the people. A democratic regime in Bangladesh, where anti-Indian sentiment is rife, will never be able to give in to the Indian demands unless the exchange is fair and equitable: for example, a transit/transshipment/ or a corridor through Bangladesh can only be discussed if Bangladesh gets the Bangladesh-Nepal and Bangladesh-Bhutan corridor/ transit; or the Indians can only ask for a respect when it can stop killing Bangladeshi people on its border day-and-night; and give Bangladesh the fair and equitable water share of transboundary rivers; or Bangladesh can stop providing sanctuary to the Indian secessionists, only when India is ready to do the same in the Hill Tracts.
8. Why a weak and an undemocratic regime is desirable for Indians? The answer is: an undemocratic regime in Bangladesh will suffer from the lack of legitimacy at home (not elected democratically), therefore, it will always seek external backings, blessings, and legitimacy. For obvious reasons, India will be the first. And for Indians, they can now extract maximum benefits at the minimum costs from an undemocratic regime that lacks bargaining power owing to its reliance on external supports rather than deriving its legitimacy from its own people. It is like Israel-Fatah-Hamas situation. Israel knows a democratic election will put Hamas in power, which is an undesirable outcome. Therefore, Fatah, an undemocratic regime in the West Bank that agrees to cooperate with Israel under duress, is always preferred over a democratically elected Hamas regime. The outcome is: Israel’s client at the expense of Palestinian democracy and interest. The same for us: India’s client at the expense of Bangladesh’s democracy and interest. If you do not understand this equation, you must not be in Bangladeshi politics. If you are in, your naivety will cost the interest of Bangladeshi people.
9. Finally, let me put it this way: There is little reason for Bangladeshis to be ‘anti-Indian’ as long as the Indians respect Bangladesh’s sovereignty and independence. But Indian contemporary history does not inspire confidence among neighbouring countries. Indian policy makers have to grow up, show a little bit of wisdom in order to foster a lasting, mutually respectful and beneficial relationship with the neighbours. Indians should draw lessons from other great powers how they managed their difficult relationship with their neighbours. The US-Mexico-Canada is an ideal example. Or they can examine the post-war German’s relationship with its continental European partners. If they follow Russian approach of bullying the neighbours and earning their respect, they are doomed. Overall, they are not Russia and will never be for obvious historical reasons.
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